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[899] 
Under the Sun: Casebooks and the Future of 
Contracts Teaching  
Thomas W. Joo* 
What is the future of the casebook in legal education? It is tempting and fashionable 
to blame the current woes of law schools on their supposedly “outdated” educational 
practices, such as casebooks. As this Article shows, however, most of the current 
criticisms of casebooks and the case method are perennial ones. This does not render 
the critiques invalid, but it does undermine the notion that they reveal a contemporary 
crisis in legal education. Indeed, they are not even specific to legal education. Rather, 
they reflect fundamental tensions in the learning of any field: theory versus practice, 
general understanding versus specific technical knowledge. By saying that there is 
nothing truly new in these criticisms, I do not mean to say that proposals for reform 
are futile or ill-advised. It is simply that there is nothing new under the sun, in legal 
education or anywhere else. Legal education has gone back and forth on these 
matters, and will continue to do so, and that is probably as it should be. 
 
 * Professor, UC Davis School of Law. This Article was prepared for a Hastings College of the 
Law Symposium in honor of Charles Knapp’s fiftieth year of law teaching. I would like to thank 
Hastings, the organizers and attendees of the conference, and of course Chuck Knapp, a leading 
scholar, teacher, and mentor in the field of contracts. I would also like to thank the UC Davis School 
of Law for its financial support of this research. 
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Introduction 
The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done 
is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.  
—Ecclesiastes 1:9 (King James).  
 
I am optimistic about the prospect of teaching contracts through 
casebooks. In light of the current mania for “disruptive innovation,” it is 
tempting and fashionable to blame the current woes of law schools on their 
supposedly “outdated” educational practices, such as casebooks. But the 
slack demand for legal education in recent years is unlikely to be a sign of 
a crisis in the quality or relevance of legal education. More likely, it is 
driven by the lack of demand for lawyers. Law firms were hiring huge 
numbers of graduates at princely salaries less than a decade ago; it seems 
implausible that legal education has undergone a wholesale decline in 
quality or relevance since then. A quick look at the history of legal 
education shows that most of the current criticisms of the case method 
have appeared before. Formal legal education generally, and the case 
method in particular, arose in direct response to the perception that legal 
training was too tied to routine law practice. For over a century, the case 
method has been both praised for its practical value and ridiculed for 
lacking such value (the most common criticism of legal education today). 
Like anything, casebooks and case-based teaching could be improved. 
But I believe they are far more useful and less hidebound than many of 
their critics would have you believe. 
Indeed, other countries continue to look to U.S. legal education as 
the model for reforming their own institutions.1 In many countries, U.S. 
legal education has literally become part of legal education. Afghanistan, 
for example, has recognized that educating lawyers in the United States 
and other countries is a faster route to rebuilding the profession than 
remaking domestic legal education.2 Foreign law graduates have long 
 
 1. See, e.g., Carole Silver, Book Review, 61 J. Legal Educ. 691, 691 (2012) (reviewing Legal 
Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts (Stacey Steele & Kathryn Taylor eds., 2011)). 
 2. Id. at 694 (citing Veronica Taylor, Legal Education as Development, in Legal Education in 
Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts, supra note 1, at 216, 223). 
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sought advanced degrees in the United States, and in recent years, many 
Chinese nationals have chosen to pursue law degrees in the United States 
and return to China to practice as “foreign-qualified lawyers.”3 Many 
foreign nationals see a U.S. legal degree as training that qualifies them to 
compete on the global level, and they see U.S. training as more practice 
oriented. In UC Davis’s International Commercial Law LL.M. program, I 
have taught many experienced practitioners with law degrees from many 
different countries. I teach U.S. corporations law using the same casebook 
I use for my J.D. classes. The students—or more to the point, lawyers—
often comment that the U.S. teaching style is more grounded in practical 
application than that in their home countries. 
As we shall see, many of the contemporary criticisms of American 
legal education, and the case method in particular, have been made 
periodically since the earliest days of the modern law school. This does 
not mean the critiques are invalid, but they are not specific to any 
contemporary crisis, the “digital age,” or the “new economy.” Indeed, they 
are not even specific to legal education. Rather, they reflect fundamental 
tensions in the learning of any field: theory versus practice, general 
understanding versus specific technical knowledge. Some degree of each 
is necessary. Moreover, there is no ideal point of balance among these 
competing and complementary priorities. The feeling of imbalance is 
justifiable, and intractable. By saying that there is nothing truly new in these 
criticisms, I do not mean to say that proposals for reform are futile or ill-
advised. It is simply that there is nothing new under the sun, in legal 
education or anywhere else. Legal education has gone back and forth on 
these matters, and will continue to do so, and that is probably as it should 
be. 
I.  Theory Versus Practice 
Critics of contemporary legal education4 often cite the 2007 Carnegie 
Report, which argued that law schools focus too heavily on doctrinal 
analysis and not enough on lawyering skills or ethics.5 Casebooks, of course, 
are far better suited to teaching the former than the latter. The tension 
between theory and practice in legal education is a constant—as is the 
anxiety about this tension among legal educators, students, and the bar. 
Indeed, the 2007 Carnegie Report is only the most recent in a century of 
reports (primarily from the Carnegie Foundation) grappling with this 
issue. The current concern about a lack of practical training also 
appeared, for example, in the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) 
 
 3. Id. (citing Taylor, supra note 2, at 226). 
 4. See, e.g., Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62 Cath. 
U. L. Rev. 643 (2013). 
 5. William M. Sullivan et al., Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, Educating 
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 56 (2007). 
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MacCrate Report in 1992,6 and in an earlier report by the Carnegie 
Foundation, the 1921 Reed Report.7 
Prior to modern academic legal education, lawyers trained through 
apprenticeships in law offices before admission to the bar. William 
Blackstone criticized this approach, arguing unless an apprentice is 
educated “in the elements and first principles upon which the rule of 
practice is founded, the least variation from established precedents will 
totally distract and bewilder him.”8 When academic law professorships 
were first introduced in U.S. colleges in the late 1700s, they were designed to 
provide the theoretical foundation for apprenticeships that Blackstone had 
recommended.9 
The Langdellian case method, and the casebook, arose as part of a 
movement to emphasize the academic character of law schools. Prior to 
the Langdellian case method, professors in law, as in other disciplines, 
educated students through lectures or textbooks.10 Dean Christopher 
Columbus Langdell introduced the case method at Harvard Law School 
in 1870, but it did not begin to spread to other schools until around 
1890.11 By 1914, a majority of American law schools had adopted some 
version of the case method.12 That year, the Carnegie Foundation 
commissioned a report on the case method. Because of continuing 
disagreement among U.S. academics over the case method, the Carnegie 
Foundation asked Josef Redlich, a professor at the University of Vienna, 
to conduct the study.13 
Redlich’s report praised the case method for teaching practical 
lawyering skills. Some U.S. lawyers then, as now, criticized the case 
method as “too academic, too ‘transcendental.’”14 Redlich, however, 
thought it was practical and useful, and more “scientific” than traditional 
methods because of its empirical grounding in actual decisions.15 He 
 
 6. Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and 
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools 
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).a
uthcheckdam.pdf.  
 7. Alfred Z. Reed, Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, Training for the Public 
Profession of the Law: Historical Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal 
Education in the United States, With Some Account of Conditions in England and Canada (1921). 
 8. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1949, 1963 (2012) (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *32). 
 9. Id. at 196465. 
 10. Bruce A. Kimball, The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr. 
Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 18901915, 46 Hist. of Educ. Q. 192, 19495 (2006).  
 11. Id. at 20203. 
 12. Josef Redlich, Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, The Common Law 
and the Case Method in American University Law Schools vii (1914). 
 13. Id. at vi. Redlich spent a total of two months visiting ten U.S. law schools. 
 14. Id. at vii. 
 15. Id. 
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thought case-method students were better prepared for practice than 
those from European law schools or those from other U.S. law schools.16 
In Redlich’s view, the case method, 
really teaches the pupil to think in the way that any practical lawyer—
whether dealing with written or with unwritten law—ought to and has 
to think. It . . . mak[es] the law pupil familiar with the law through 
incessant practice in the analysis of law cases, where the concepts, 
principles, and rules of Anglo-American law are recorded not as dry 
abstractions but as cardinal realities in the inexhaustibly rich, 
ceaselessly fluctuating social and economic life of man.17 
In fact, early critics of the case method argued both that the case method 
was excessively theoretical and that it was too practical.18 The latter 
criticism was apparently based on the belief that lawyers would engage in 
the “mindless collection of precedents in an attempt to win judgments for 
their clients based only on the assumed weight of the collected cases, rather 
than appeal to the principles of the common law.”19 In other words, the 
study of cases provides fuel for advocacy, but not understanding of the law. 
In 1921, another Carnegie Foundation report, this one by Alfred Reed, 
criticized the lack of real-life practical training in U.S. law schools. As 
noted above, most law schools followed the case method by this time, but 
not all lawyers went to law school; many received their training through 
the traditional apprenticeship method.20 Most states permitted law school 
as a substitute for apprenticeship, but few states required formal legal 
education for bar admission.21 The Reed Report recognized the emergence 
of three kinds of law schools: scholarly schools, schools focused on local 
practice, and part-time night schools: 
The scholarly law school dean properly seeks to build up a ‘nursery for 
judges’ that will make American law what American law ought to be. 
The practitioner bar examiner . . . properly seeks to prepare students 
for the immediate practice of the law as it is. The night school 
authorities, finally, see most clearly that the interests not only of the 
individual but of the community demand that participation in the 
making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible to 
Lincoln’s plain people. All these are worthy ideals. . . . But no single 
institution, pursuing its special aim, can attain both the others as well.22 
In this passage, Reed advocated for law schools with a range of 
different goals. The ABA, however, seems to have misunderstood Reed 
 
 16. Id. at viii. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Kimball, supra note 10, at 22526. 
 19. Id. at 226 (quoting William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern 
American Legal Education, 133 (1994)). 
 20. Id. at 19798 (“Although many law professors considered the question resolved in their favor 
by 1895, the issue remained disputed . . . .”). 
 21. Spencer, supra note 8, at 1995. 
 22. Reed, supra note 7, at 418. 
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as advocating for law schools with different—that is, lower—educational 
standards.23 Thus, the ABA commissioned its own report, intended to 
protect the “scholarly” law schools from this perceived challenge.24 The 
ABA called for a uniform standard of a three-year law degree following 
at least two years of college.25 It also recommended that each school have 
a “sufficient number” of full-time instructors (as distinct from legal 
practitioners) and its own dedicated law library.26 According to one 
observer, “[t]hese requirements all meant to homogenize law schools 
around standards that tilted in favor of the national, full-time law 
schools.”27 Ironically, given the contemporary bar’s criticisms of the 
scholarly law school approach, the ABA played a key role in that model’s 
dominance. 
This convergence on the scholarly model obviously contributed to the 
academic nature of modern lawyer training, including the use of casebooks. 
When the case method began to spread from Harvard to other law schools 
around 1890, it was bound up with a series of “academic, meritocratic 
reforms” that Harvard had also adopted, including: 
extending the degree course to three years; requiring a bachelor’s 
degree for admission and then selecting among qualified applicants; 
conducting written examinations for promotion and graduation; 
grading and sequencing the curriculum among first-, second-, and 
third-year courses; transforming the library from a textbook repository 
into a scholarly resource; and hiring full-time instructors who regarded 
the professorate as their career. Case method entailed these 
meritocratic reforms because teaching with original sources required 
both stronger academic preparation and a much greater time 
commitment on the part of both students and faculty.28 
The case method became “emblematic” of “the view that academic merit 
defined professional merit,” and the prestige and influence of law schools 
continues to derive primarily from the academic qualifications of their 
professors and students.29 
The reintegration of hands-on training into law teaching is usually 
traced to the late 1960s, when the Ford Foundation began supporting 
clinical legal training and the Council on Legal Education for Professional 
Responsibility began advocating for clinical education.30 Around the 
same time, however, yet another Carnegie report warned against 
exclusive reliance on clinical teaching. The report echoed Blackstone’s 
 
 23. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 1997. 
 24. Id. at 199597. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1997. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Kimball, supra note 10, at 195. 
 29. Id. at 198. 
 30. Judith Welch Wegner, The Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers: Four Questions for Bar 
Examiners, B. Examiner, June 2011, at 11, 16. 
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criticism of apprenticeships and, moreover, reflected the continuing 
search for balance: “We are also concerned that an anti-intellectual 
tendency of clinical education will offer an allure to students and to some 
faculty members who seek ‘relevance’ at any price.”31 The report 
recommended moderation: “experimentation with many modest ideas, 
one of which is clinical education.”32 The basic concept of classroom 
education followed by clinical experience is reminiscent of the original 
idea of academic legal education as the intellectual foundation for 
apprenticeships. 
II.  Critical Thinking: The Practicality of the Abstract 
The concern about balancing the practical and the theoretical is 
absolutely appropriate and absolutely intractable. Legal practice itself 
involves both abstract ideas and nuts-and-bolts practicalities. Moreover, 
the debate between the theoretical and practical in legal education echoes 
the fundamental philosophical debate between rule-based and pragmatic 
approaches to jurisprudence, legislation, and every kind of legal problem 
solving. Balancing the two is a continual and healthy process. It is not a 
sign of a new crisis, nor is it a tension that will ever be resolved. 
But the distinction between theoretical study and practical skills may 
be overdrawn. As Redlich argued, the exercise of extracting principles 
from decisions is itself a practical skill for a lawyer.33 More broadly, as 
early defenders of the case method argued, the purpose of legal 
education is not to teach students the rules of law, but “‘the power of 
legal reasoning.’”34 
Even more broadly, the case method is intended to develop 
analytical ability and critical thinking skills. According to one recent 
study, “[t]he defining feature . . . of the last 30 years has been a 
precipitous increase in the wage payoff to jobs requiring synthesis, 
critical thinking, and deductive and inductive reasoning.”35 American 
colleges and universities, however, may be failing to train students in 
such “generic competencies.” Employers complain that few recent 
college graduates have excellent skills in critical thinking and problem 
solving.36 Longitudinal studies of college students’ critical thinking skills 
 
 31. Herbert L. Packer & Thomas Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal Education 46 (1972). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Redlich, supra note 12, at viii. 
 34. Kimball, supra note 10, at 227 (quoting Discussion of Kale’s Paper, in Report of the 
Thirtieth Meeting of the American Bar Association 1025 (1907) (comments of James Barr Ames)). 
 35. Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Aspiring Adults Adrift: Tentative Transitions of 
College Graduates 19 (2014) (quoting Yujia Liu & David B. Grusky, The Payoff Skill in the Third 
Industrial Revolution, 118 Am. J. Soc. 1330, 1332 (2013)). 
 36. Id. at 19 (citing Jill Casner-Lotto & Linda Barrington, Are They Really Ready to Work? 
Employers’ Perspectives on the Basic Knowledge and Applied Skills of New Entrants to the 
21st Century U.S. Workforce (2006)). 
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have found that those skills do not improve significantly during college.37 
One study found that “if the CLA [Collegiate Learning Assessment, a 
test of job-related critical thinking skills] were rescaled to a one-hundred-
point scale, approximately one-third of students would not improve more 
than one point over four years of college.”38 
A recent follow-up study examined students two years after 
graduation.39 Those who had scored well on the critical thinking test at 
graduation were significantly less likely to be unemployed, less likely to 
have lost their jobs, and less likely to be employed in unskilled 
occupations.40 They also reported greater job satisfaction.41 Abstract 
critical reasoning skills, then, may have material value that presumably 
derives from their practical value in the workplace. Law school students, 
with their higher GPAs and LSAT scores, are likely to have better 
critical thinking skills than the average college graduate. But if critical 
thinking is truly underemphasized in college, even these elite students 
require (and will benefit from) further training. 
III.  Context: Forest Versus Trees 
A common criticism of casebooks is that they present a set of 
discrete, and often disconnected, doctrinal points without the overview 
and context that a textbook or treatise might provide. This criticism is 
also an old one, dating back at least as far as Redlich’s 1914 Carnegie 
Report.42 Redlich noted that under the case method, “the students never 
obtain a general picture of the law as a whole.”43 Nor, he noted, did 
students get an explanation of basic legal concepts before encountering 
them in cases.44 He argued that every area of law uses “certain common 
elementary ideas and fundamental legal concepts which the student ought 
to be made to understand before he is introduced into the difficult 
analysis of cases.”45 According to Redlich, these basic concepts “should 
not, as usually occurs to-day, come to the students unsystematically and 
unscientifically, as scraps of knowledge more or less assimilated out of 
 
 37. See generally Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on 
College Campuses (2011) (reporting results using the Collegiate Learning Assessment); Ernest T. 
Pascarella et al., How Robust are the Findings of Academically Adrift?, Change, May/June 2011 
(reporting consistent results based on a different measure of critical thinking skills). 
 38. Arum & Roksa, supra note 35, at 38. 
 39. Id. at 6061. 
 40. Id. at 6065 (testing performance did not correlate to higher income, however). 
 41. Id. at 7677. 
 42. See generally Redlich, supra note 12. 
 43. Id. at 41. 
 44. Id. at 42.  
 45. Id. (including “choses in action, person and property within the meaning of the law, complaint 
and plea, title and stipulation, liability and surety, good faith and fraud”).  
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law dictionaries and indiscriminate reading of text-books.”46 Of course, 
that is precisely how most of us first learned them, and probably still how 
most students learn them today. Redlich argued that law schools should 
instead offer overview courses of fundamental legal institutions and 
principles.47 
Langdell seems to have disagreed with Redlich on the value of 
offering explanation—explanatory material accounted for less than one 
percent of Langdell’s casebooks.48 But other early casebook authors did 
appreciate the value of textual explanation: precisely what distinguished 
the traditional textbook from the casebook. James B. Thayer’s 1892 
Cases on Evidence “attended to his readers by expanding the explanatory 
commentary in order to help the student understand the cases”—such 
commentary made up nearly twenty percent of Thayer’s casebook.49 
While some law schools (including my own) offer introductory 
(though not, to my knowledge, final) overview courses like those Redlich 
suggested, these offerings do not seem to be comprehensive or well 
integrated into the curriculum. Curricular overhaul of that sort is unrealistic 
in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, casebooks (and classroom 
instructors) should recognize that students lack such background, while 
opinions are written for experienced lawyers who have it. Casebooks could 
borrow a page from student versions of Shakespeare or the Bible that have 
extensive annotations describing antiquated terms. In this respect, digital 
casebooks could be useful. For example, clickable pop-up annotations could 
reduce visual clutter. 
Casebooks could take Redlich’s advice and offer more background 
and explanation of basic concepts.50 While including background material 
in every introductory casebook might create some redundancy across 
multiple courses, that would not necessarily be a bad thing. It would 
illustrate and reinforce these fundamentals and underscore their 
importance. Repetition in learning is often underestimated in legal 
education, where we strain to maximize the breadth of coverage, often 
sacrificing retention. 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. Redlich also argued for summary and overview at the end of law school: “lectures which shall 
furnish the American law student once more, before he steps out directly into practical legal life, a 
certain general summing up and survey of the law.” Id. at 45. He also argued that this summing up and 
survey should include a comparative perspective. In this respect, he sounded much like today’s 
advocates for comparative law in teaching: “[T]he comparative method would go far to make the 
features and characteristics of the native law still clearer to the students, and to deepen their 
understanding of their own law through their insight into that of other peoples.” Id.  
 48. Kimball, supra note 10, at 21718. 
 49. Id. 
 50. They could, for example, explain the difference between deciding a motion to dismiss and 
rendering a judgment on the merits. 
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IV.  Cases and Beyond 
Even casebooks with significant explanatory material consist 
primarily of “cases.” As Jerome Frank noted in the 1930s, however, the 
law school “case” method is not actually the study of “cases,” but of 
appellate opinions.51 A “case” in a casebook is not a comprehensive case 
history, in the sense of the history of a concrete problem. Nor is it a 
problem for the student to solve. Rather, it is a court’s (usually an 
appellate court’s) disposition of narrow legal issues that constitute one 
aspect of a legal dispute. If the “case” more properly refers to the larger 
story of the litigants’ problem, an opinion is just one small part of the 
“case.” 
This characteristic of law school “cases” does not make them 
inherently flawed, but it is indicative of the original purpose (and limits) 
of the Langdellian method: training in inductive reasoning.52 The 
Langdellian notion was that students should not be simply told the 
supposed first principles of common law, but should try to induce general 
principles from examples.53 Opinions are evidence from which the 
student can conclude what the law says; a textbook can only tell you what 
the author thinks the law says. The focus on common law induction has 
been criticized as outdated since the common law has become relatively 
unimportant in the age of statutes and administrative law.54 But the 
modern era is not discontinuous with the common law one. The narrow, 
incremental nature of common law opinions is extremely influential (for 
better or for worse) on the judicial approach to the interpretation of 
statutes, and in turn on agency rulemaking and interpretation. A lawyer 
attempting to interpret a statute or rule must do so (again, for better or 
for worse) in reference to general principles induced from judicial (and 
agency) precedent as well as in reference to the text. 
Furthermore, the use of opinions in teaching need not be limited to 
the induction of common law principles. The opinion can be used to 
illustrate the application of a particular legal rule (or, more broadly, the 
practice of applying a rule to a set of facts). This use of cases as specific 
examples demonstrating general principles is the reverse of what 
Langdell intended by his “case method,” which focused on having the 
student induce the general legal principle from specific examples. But 
 
 51. Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 910 (1933). 
 52. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 Vand. L. 
Rev. 609, 63435 (2007). 
 53. See id. at 632–33. 
 54. See generally id.  
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this approach is nearly as old as Langdell’s, and was pioneered at UC 
Hastings College of the Law, the host of this Symposium.55 
More problematic than their narrow focus is the fact that appellate 
opinions are not representative resolutions of legal problems. Most 
litigation issues are not decided on appeal; moreover, most legal problems 
do not (or should not) involve litigation at all, but are resolved by advice 
and planning, drafting, or negotiation.56 But usefulness of cases is not 
limited to teaching the rules of decision in litigation. As an illustrated 
statement of a rule (whether common law or statutory), an opinion can 
be used for solving a problem whether it be a dispute to be litigated, a 
negotiation “in the shadow of the law,”57 or a planning problem. The 
facts of an opinion can also be used to illustrate a type of problem, to 
which the instructor might suggest non-litigation solutions.58 
For all the limitations of casebooks, perhaps their greatest virtue is 
that they require the student to engage with primary sources. Many 
entering law students have limited experience with primary sources; they 
are more familiar with predigested textbooks and lectures. Casebooks 
help students recognize that rules of law do not originate from the 
pronouncements of a professor or treatise author, but from primary 
sources written by people wielding political power and authority.59 Those 
sources are diverse, dispersed, and sometimes unclear or inconsistent. 
The question “What is the rule?” often has no answer, and looking at the 
primary sources can illustrate that. 
Unfortunately, casebooks expose students almost exclusively to one 
type of legal source—appellate opinions—but hardly at all to other legal 
sources. Frank thought it would be more useful to study “elaborate court 
records, including the briefs (and supplemented by reading of text-books 
as well as upper court opinions).”60 Of course, time is limited, so it would be 
impossible to supplement every opinion with “elaborate court records.”61 
But mere exposure to other legal documents can help reinforce the message 
that the law is more than opinions. Some concepts or doctrine could be 
taught with documents other than opinions. In my white collar crime 
course, for example, I have found that the elements of a crime can be 
 
 55. At Hastings in the 1880s, John Pomeroy “assigned cases not inductively but illustratively—to 
demonstrate the points already made in his lectures and syllabi.” Kimball, supra note 10, at 208. Many 
schools pursued this “illustrative case method” rather than the Langdellian inductive method. Id. at 221. 
 56. See Rubin, supra note 52, at 653 (“A revised curriculum would benefit students in their 
careers by signaling to them that litigation is not necessarily the favored form of legal action.”). 
 57. See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979). 
 58. See infra pp. 912–13. 
 59. Of course, we leave it to our legal research and writing courses to teach them how to find 
these primary sources. 
 60. Frank, supra note 51, at 916. 
 61. Id. 
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efficiently illustrated using the statutory text and an indictment. An 
indictment must allege facts illustrating every element of the crime, while 
an appellate opinion will probably address only some elements. Similarly, 
the allegations of a complaint for breach of contract might be used to 
illustrate contract formation and elements of enforceability.62 
Students also need exposure to non-litigation sources, such as, most 
obviously, contracts.63 But I think a little goes a long way. Extensive work 
in reading and drafting contracts is not of great use to beginning 
students. An actual contract is usually so long, dense, and mystifying that 
a first-year student cannot learn much from it. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to appreciate the significance of contractual provisions without knowing 
both the law and the relevant business context. 
V.  Instructor, Heal Thyself 
Casebooks are typically missing some of the essential pieces of a 
complete course, but that is not necessarily grounds for complaint. 
Instructors supply most of those missing pieces—as well they should. As 
a teacher, I have never expected a casebook to be a complete package of 
course materials. Casebooks were certainly not presented to me that way 
when I was a student. I was explicitly expected to write case briefs and 
compose my own course outlines (and implicitly expected to consult 
treatises and even commercial outlines). Most professors made changes 
to the book’s organization and distributed at least some supplementary 
materials, further conveying the (useful) notions that the casebook was 
merely one resource among many, with no special authority, and that 
there are many possible ways to structure a course or explain a concept. 
Indeed, the primary methods of in-class instruction are Socratic 
questioning or free-ranging discussion, methods that few, if any, casebooks 
are expressly structured to facilitate. The discussion aspect is value added 
to the course by the instructor. By contrast, an undergraduate textbook 
might be structured with the expectation that the professor’s lectures will 
primarily repeat the same content as the reading (and discussion sections, 
not led by the instructor, will consist of answering questions that appear 
in the textbook). 
The fact that the casebook is not expressly geared to the format of 
the class session means much more work for us, but I think that is good 
for us as teachers and researchers of the law. Ideally every instructor 
would construct her own materials, but, of course, most of our employers 
expect us to spend more time on scholarship than on “mere” class 
preparation. We should construct at least part of them, however, and not 
 
 62. I should disclose here that I have not tried this myself. 
 63. Private documents such as contracts may be difficult to obtain; however, some statutory 
supplements do an admirable job of locating them and making them available. 
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expect the book to be a just-add-water “instant” course. That adds to our 
understanding of the materials, which hopefully benefits our students. 
Furthermore, it means we are adding value to the classroom experience 
(or at least are attempting to), rather than simply regurgitating someone 
else’s book. 
Despite the antiquity of the “case method,” casebooks can be used 
to teach useful contemporary lessons. Langdell was motivated by some 
antiquated notions, most notably the quaint idea that law is a “natural 
science,” to which scientific induction could be literally applied.64 Thus, 
we should not credit him with foreseeing the needs of contemporary law 
students and teachers.65 But neither should we reject the use of opinions 
for this reason. Casebooks need not be, and, as far as I know, generally 
are not, used for the purpose of teaching the “scientific” induction of 
fundamental truths about law. To the extent they teach inductive 
reasoning, it is what might be termed “induction-lite”—trying to find 
common themes among multiple decisions. Furthermore, as noted above, 
judicial opinions have been used at least since the 1880s for illustrative as 
well as inductive purposes—that is, simply to show a rule in action. 
Opinions are not limited to common law subjects—they can also be used 
to teach “modern” concepts like statutory and rule application and 
interpretation. 
Teaching from casebooks has practical potential, which Redlich 
recognized. The problem is, as the 2007 Carnegie Report recognized, we 
as teachers do not always use opinions with a mind to why they are 
useful.66 We should explain clearly to students (and remind ourselves as 
teachers) that we crunch cases not to memorize things for the exam, but 
because it is something that lawyers do. This kind of message—why we study 
what we study—probably gets across better when told to the students 
than when written in a casebook. In advocating or in formulating legal 
advice, a lawyer must manipulate cases, holdings, and doctrine, not 
memorize them.67 It is also important to avoid the tendency to ponder 
how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Students excel at posing 
fiendishly clever, but outlandish, hypotheticals. I refuse to spend time on 
such questions, however, on the grounds that their answers are of no 
practical use. Moreover, pondering them means forgetting that we study 
law to solve the real problems of real people. 
 
 64. Rubin, supra note 52, at 615 (“Our failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with 
false colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the rationales for this curriculum 
correspond to our current understanding of law, society, and education.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 188 (“One limitation [of legal education] is the casual 
attention that most law schools give to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of 
actual law practice.”). 
 67. Unfortunately, this is very different from what students have to do on the bar exam. 
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I emphasize to students that the answer to any legal question means 
nothing in the abstract: it only matters insofar as it helps solve (or avoid) 
an actual legal problem. Imagine, for example, a contracts exam question 
that turns on the enforceability of a written agreement to perform a 
major construction project. My exam questions typically ask for a memo 
analyzing a specific problem, such as whether your client can enforce the 
contract. Student A goes into great detail analyzing whether the 
construction cannot be performed within one year from the making of 
the agreement, such that it would fall within the state’s statute of frauds. 
Student B points out that the contract is fully memorialized in a signed 
writing that satisfies the statute, so whether it is within the statute has no 
effect on its enforceability. I would give no credit to Student A. Both 
students show understanding of contract doctrine, as expressed in the 
opinions and statutes we read. But only Student B understands why we 
read the opinions and statutes. Student A is playing with doctrine to 
answer a question, while failing to recognize that the answer is of no 
consequence to the client. As a lawyer, you work for clients, and clients 
do not pay lawyers to indulge idle curiosity. In the words of the 2007 
Carnegie Report, I want students to think more like lawyers and less like 
students; to disabuse them of “the impression that lawyers are more like 
competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of 
clients.”68 
The prominence of appellate opinions in casebooks can create the 
misimpression that legal practice is—and should be—litigation focused. 
The instructor can do much to counteract this without having to change 
materials. In contracts, I encourage students to ask whether the case 
should even have been brought. In some opinions, the law and facts so 
obviously favor one side that the plaintiff should not have brought suit, 
or the defendant should have settled rather than wasting time and money 
trying to defend herself. In others, the plaintiff wins, but the law limits 
recovery such that suit is not worthwhile. I also encourage students to 
weigh the value of winning legal remedies against the cost of litigation—
not just attorney fees, but also time and aggravation, as well as the 
damage to business relationships. The narratives in legal opinions can 
help illustrate these concerns. 
Opinions can also be used to teach concrete transactional lessons. 
Chaim Saiman gives an excellent example of “reading cases like a 
transactional lawyer” in Contracts class.69 He assigns the “traditional 
battery” of opinions regarding letters of intent, and identifies the core 
issues: whether a document is intended to be binding or nonbinding, the 
 
 68. Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 188.  
 69. Chaim Saiman, Transactional Lawyering—A Conceptual Approach, 12 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 83, 
8990 (2011). 
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precise nature of the duty to negotiate in good faith, and uncertainty 
about the appropriate remedy for breach of that duty.70 Then he gives 
students a very simple hypothetical transaction (the contemplated sale of 
a car) and asks students to draft a nonbinding letter of intent. He does 
not expect first-year students to draft “a perfect or even serviceable 
document,” but looks to see whether they understand the basic difficulties 
and whether they drafted language that attempts to “avoid the pitfalls 
reflected in the caselaw.”71 That is, the opinions do not provide any “rules” 
per se, but the narratives illustrate problems that parties and courts 
encounter in this transactional context. Saiman shows his students that a 
good transactional lawyer must be familiar with the issues that have proven 
to be troublesome, and attempt to address them ex ante through planning 
and drafting.72 This is a far cry from Langdell’s inductive case method. 
An even simpler example of a transactional perspective on a judicial 
opinion is to ask whether the losing party in a case might have avoided—
or, more precisely, reduced the probability of—an adverse decision via 
good drafting. Some simple examples: even though it is not necessarily 
determinative, it would be wise to add an integration clause if you want 
to limit a contract to the terms of a written agreement, and it would be 
foolish to label a stipulated damages provision a “penalty” clause. As in 
Saiman’s example, the point is not to craft the ideal language, but to 
demonstrate how business interests can be furthered, and the likelihood 
of disputes reduced, by careful planning informed by knowledge of legal 
issues (which does not necessarily consist of “rules”). 
Conclusion 
I am optimistic about the value of casebooks in legal education, but 
the reader should take my optimism with a grain of salt. The same factors 
that fueled resistance to the original case method are likely to contribute 
to its persistence: “Those [professors] who have . . . attained, financially, 
a professional position under the older methods, may hesitate in 
sanctioning the innovation which retires any method by which they 
acquired affluence.”73 Although I am not a casebook author, I acquire my 
“affluence” (such as it is) from teaching out of casebooks. My practice 
experience is nearly two decades old. As noted above, the case method 
was closely related to the larger shift from part-time practitioner-teachers 
to full-time academics. Thus, when the case method was introduced, the 
practitioners who taught law part-time at for-profit schools stood to be 
 
 70. Id. at 90. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 91. 
 73. S. Stanwood Menken, Methods of Instruction at American Law Schools. II. Columbia College, in 
the City of New York, Colum. L. Times, Mar. 1893, at 168, quoted in Kimball, supra note 10, at 228. 
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replaced by full-time non-practicing academics at universities.74 A new 
shift away from casebooks and back toward practice-oriented instructors 
would require at least a partial reversal of that process. All of this has 
happened before . . . and it may all happen again. 
 
 
 74. Id. 
